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Abstract: Debunking arguments in ethics contend that our moral beliefs have dubious 
evolutionary, cultural, or psychological origins – hence concluding that we should doubt such 
beliefs. Debates about debunking are often couched in coarse-grained terms – about whether 
our moral beliefs are justified or not, for instance. In this paper, I propose a more detailed 
Bayesian analysis of debunking arguments, which proceeds in the fine-grained framework of 
rational confidence. Such analysis promises several payoffs: it highlights how debunking 
arguments don’t affect all agents, but rather only those agents who updated on their intuitions 
using a specific range of evidentiary weights; it underscores how the debunkers shouldn’t 
conclude that we should reduce confidence beyond some threshold, but rather only that we 
should reduce confidence by some amount; and it proposes a method of integrating different 
kinds of evidence – about the kinds of epistemic flaws at play, about the different possible 
origins of our moral beliefs, about the background normative assumptions we’re entitled to 
make – in order to arrive at a rational moral credence in light of debunking.  
 
1. Introduction 
We all have moral beliefs, and should change them upon learning relevant evidence. When 
we learn about the dubious origins of our moral beliefs, how, if ever, should we revise such 
beliefs? We might learn that our moral beliefs were strongly influenced by evolutionary, 
cultural, or psychological causes – and so had we evolved differently, been raised in a 
different culture, or been exposed to a thought experiment in a different condition, we would 
have very different moral intuitions and beliefs (or no such mental states at all).1 Or we might 
learn that these causes strongly inculcated certain beliefs or intuitions in us – such that had 
the moral facts been different, we would still have judged the way we did.2 Some philosophers 
 
1 See Street (2006, pp. 120–121), Joyce (2006, p. 181), Bogardus (2016, pp. 655–658), de Lazari-Radek and Singer 
(2012, pp. 21–28), Machery (2017, pp. 72–73, 81–83), Liao et al. (2012), Sinnott-Armstrong (2011), Horowitz 
(1998).  
2 See Morton (2016, pp. 242–243), Ruse and Wilson (1985, p. 52). 
argue that learning these things should make us less confident in our moral beliefs – they 
press what’s known as a debunking argument in the literature.3   
Talk of learning evidence that then dictates a reduction in confidence naturally suggests 
adopting a Bayesian approach to analysing debunking – Bayesian epistemology being our 
leading theory of normative constraints on probabilistic belief. In this paper, I hope to 
propose a thorough Bayesian analysis that can help us better understand debunking 
arguments – in particular, one that will help clarify key mechanics, uncover crucial 
assumptions, and allow us to measure the strength of a debunking argument.4   
My analysis has the following payoffs: First, I highlight an important but unnoticed condition 
for debunking to work – debunking arguments don’t undermine everyone’s confidence in the 
relevant moral beliefs; rather they only undermine confidence for agents who have previously 
updated on their intuitions using a certain evidentiary weight. Second, I argue that the 
debunkers shouldn’t conclude that we should reduce confidence beyond some threshold like 
0.5 (or that we should be agnostic about our moral beliefs), rather they should only conclude 
that we should reduce confidence by some amount. Third, I provide a method for 
determining how big this reduction should be, in light of different factors – concerning the 
different kinds of epistemic flaws that might be at play, the different possible origins of our 
moral beliefs, and the kinds of background normative assumptions we’re entitled to make. I 
also argue that one variant of debunking (corresponding to sensitivity-based arguments) has 
a greater marginal impact on our credences than another (which corresponds to safety-based 
arguments). With this analysis, I hope to move the debunking debate from a coarse-grained 
description of epistemic impact – about whether our moral beliefs are justified or unjustified, 
for instance – to a finer-grained and more nuanced treatment, about when we should reduce 
confidence, and by how much.  
This paper will proceed as follows: I introduce the Bayesian framework in section 2, and give 
reasons why it’s well-suited for understanding debunking arguments. In section 3, I specify 
the possible hypotheses and evidence at play in the debunking debate. I present the Bayesian 
 
3 The debunking argument establishes an epistemic conclusion about what we should believe, not a metaphysical 
one about whether moral facts exist (Vavova, 2015, p. 105). Street (2006) thinks this epistemic conclusion only 
holds if we assume that the moral facts are mind-independent – if you agree with her, then you can see this 
paper as working out the Bayesian picture on this assumption. 
4 For other work using Bayesianism to analyse debunking, see Brosnan (2011), Goldman (2016; 2015), and 
O’Neill (2015), who cites Roush’s (2007) truth-tracking approach. Philosophers might be reluctant to apply a 
probabilistic Bayesian framework to debunking because they see moral truths as necessary truths. However I 
believe that Bayesianism can still be profitably used to analyse our evidential (or epistemic) probabilities about 
morality, or just the rational degrees of belief to hold about morality, given our uncertainty about it.    
model in section 4, draw out some implications and extensions in section 5, and conclude in 
section 6.  
 
2. The Bayesian Framework and Why It’s Appropriate for Analysing Debunking 
Bayesian epistemology is a normative theory of probabilistic belief – it concerns how we 
should revise our beliefs in light of the evidence. It takes agents to have doxastic attitudes 
called credences – these are modelled using numbers from 0 to 1, and indicate how confident 
an agent is in a proposition. For example, I might have 0.6 credence in the proposition “The 
patient has the disease”. Bayesians propose a few normative constraints governing our 
credences. One core set governs how credences should behave at a time – these are 
Kolmogorov’s probability axioms.5 Another constraint governs how credences should evolve 
over time as the agent gains more evidence. Let h be the hypothesis that the agent is 
entertaining (for instance, that “The patient has the disease”), let e be the evidence that she 
gets (for instance, that “The patient returned a positive test result”), and assume (for now) 
that the evidence is learned for sure. Let Crnew(.) be the new, post-learning credence function, 
and Crold(.) be the old credence function. Bayesians claim that the agent should update her 
credences according to Conditionalization, which says that 
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) = 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑒), 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐶𝑟 (𝑒) > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑟 (𝑒) = 1 
 




𝐶𝑟 (𝑒|ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
𝐶𝑟 (𝑒)
 (𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑚) 
=
𝐶𝑟 (𝑒|ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
𝐶𝑟 (𝑒|ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) +  𝐶𝑟 (𝑒|~ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ)
 (𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
 
In this equation, we have a way of relating the agent’s new credence in the hypothesis, 
Crnew(h), to some of her old credences – Crold(h), which is known as a prior for h, and 
Crold(e|h) and Crold(e|~h), which are known as likelihoods. The orthodox Bayesian picture has 
it that an agent starts off with some initial probability function – which includes these priors 
and likelihoods – and then updates via Conditionalization as she receives more evidence. In 
 
5 For a precise statement, see Talbott (2016).  
each update, she changes her credence in the evidence to 1, and then redistributes her 
credences proportionately to the hypothesis h and its alternatives.  
To get clearer on how this works, let’s look at an example of a doctor trying to decide whether 
a patient has a disease. (This is a stock example of Bayesian epistemology, but I believe it’s 
quite analogous to debunking – and so is worth going through in detail.) We start off in time 
period 1 (denoted by a credence function with subscript 1), where the doctor, informed by 
frequency data from the population, has some prior credences in hypotheses about the 
patient’s condition. Let Cr1(disease) be the doctor’s credence in the hypothesis that “The 
patient has the disease”, and Cr1(~disease) be the doctor’s credence in the alternative 
hypothesis. Let’s say that disease is quite rare, so the doctor thinks it’s more likely that the 
patient doesn’t have the disease. We might assign the values for their credences as 
𝐶𝑟 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = 0.2 
𝐶𝑟 (~𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = 1 − 𝐶𝑟 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) =  0.8 
 
The doctor wants to administer a test for the disease. To update on the results of this test, they 
need the likelihoods – that is, the conditional credences that they get a positive result, given 
that the patient actually has, or actually doesn’t have, the disease. Let Cr1(positive|disease) be 
the doctor’s likelihood that the patient would return a positive test result, given that the 
patient actually has the disease. We can think of this as representing the doctor’s beliefs about 
the true positive rate – that is, about the proportion of positive results that would be returned 
for patients who actually have the disease. Let Cr1(positive|~disease) be the doctor’s likelihood 
that the patient would return a positive test result, given that the patient doesn’t actually have 
the disease. We can think of this as representing the doctor’s belief about the false positive 
rate – the rate at which the test gives a positive result, given that the patient doesn’t actually 
have the disease. Given that the doctor sees the test as reliable, we might assign values for 
these likelihoods as follows   
𝐶𝑟 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = 0.9 
𝐶𝑟 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|~𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = 0.3 
 
In time period 2, the doctor administers the test and obtains a positive test result. How should 
they update their credence in their hypothesis? To find out, we apply Conditionalization, 
Bayes Theorem, and the Law of Total Probability. Let Cr2(disease) be the doctor’s period 2 




𝐶𝑟 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒). 𝐶𝑟 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)
𝐶𝑟 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒)
=
𝐶𝑟 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒). 𝐶𝑟 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)
𝐶𝑟 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒). 𝐶𝑟 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) +  𝐶𝑟 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|~𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒). 𝐶𝑟 (~𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)
 
 





0.9 × 0.2 +  0.3 × 0.8
= 0.43  
 
After receiving the positive test result, the doctor should adopt a credence of 0.43 in the 
hypothesis that the patient has the disease. This is an increase from Cr1(disease), which was 
0.2.  
This example shows how Bayesians might prescribe changes in credences, given certain 
values for the priors and likelihoods. But Bayesians might impose further constraints on these 
values too. For instance, Sober (2008, pp. 24–30) argues that scientists can sometimes use 
frequency data to inform their likelihoods too. In our example, the likelihood 
Cr1(positive|disease) could be informed by giving the test to people whom we already know 
have the disease, and seeing how many positive results are obtained.  
These Bayesian constraints are often interpreted as governing how an agent’s credences 
should change over time. But there’s another interpretation that fits better with my project. 
Lange (1999) argues that Bayesian norms can also govern the steps in the arguments by which 
our current credences are justified. He gives the example of a forecaster who wants to argue 
that her 0.8 credence in ‘It will rain and not snow tomorrow’ is justified. She starts with a 
prior probability distribution over this hypothesis and its alternatives – a distribution that 
others will grant her as an argumentative ‘free move’ that needs no further justification. She 
then introduces the first piece of evidence – say, that ‘Today’s barometric pressure is 29 torr’ 
– and ‘updates’ her initial distribution to an intermediate conclusion (another probability 
distribution) via Conditionalization. She continues introducing further evidence she has, 
‘updating’ in this way until she has considered all relevant evidence. If her justificatory 
argument works, then she should arrive at a distribution assigning 0.8 credence to ‘It will rain 
and not snow tomorrow’. If not, then something has gone wrong, and she’s not justified in 
assigning 0.8 credence to the hypothesis (Lange, 1999, pp. 302–306). 
On this interpretation, her actual credences don’t change as she considers each new piece of 
evidence. Rather, each intermediate probability distribution represents an intermediate 
conclusion on the way to justifying her actual credence. Furthermore, the priors represent an 
argumentative ‘free move’ that needs no further justification, while the likelihoods represent 
the evidentiary weight she believes should be accorded to each piece of evidence. Lange used 
this story to account for the confirmation of scientific theories, but it can be usefully applied 
to philosophical argumentation too. The debunkers’ opponents cite some intuitions, 
judgments, or beliefs as evidence to justify their credence in moral hypotheses – much like 
how the forecaster cites the barometer reading as evidence for their prediction. In response, 
the debunkers argue that given some debunking story, these mental states shouldn’t be 
accorded much evidential weight, if any – so their opponents are unjustified in assigning the 
credence they do. This is analogous to a forecaster who realizes that a barometer is faulty – 
arguing that we shouldn’t give much evidentiary weight to its readings, and that anyone who 
did so would end up with an unjustified credence. The Bayesian picture thus seems well-
equipped to model the debate between the debunkers and their opponents, and I hope to 
demonstrate its benefits below. In the next section, I start by interpreting the debate in 
Bayesian terms.  
 
3. Debunking in Bayesian Terms 
Bayesianism works with some hypothesis (like ‘The patient has the disease’) and evidence 
(like ‘The patient returned a positive test result’). What might they be in debunking? First, 
let’s look at some prominent hypotheses:  
 “We have greater obligations to help our own children than we do to help complete 
strangers” (Street, 2006, p. 115) 
 Cooperation is morally good (Brosnan, 2011, p. 53) 
 It is morally permissible to redirect the trolley in the Switch, Footbridge, and Loop 
cases (Liao et al., 2012; Machery, 2017, Chapter 2) 
 Categorical moral reasons exist – these apply to everyone regardless of what their 
desires are, and have inescapable force (Joyce, 2006; Morton, 2016) 
I want the later analysis to apply to these different possibilities, so I’ll work with a generic 
moral hypothesis, h. What about the evidence? Here, too, there is variation. We might take 
the evidence for a moral hypothesis h to be that 
 Everyone believes that h (Parfit, 1986, p. 186),  
 You believe that h (Brosnan, 2011; A. Goldman, 2016), 
 You have the intuition that h (Huemer, 2005) 
Here I cannot remain neutral. First, treating the evidence as everyone’s believing that h 
shortchanges the debunking argument. The debunkers don’t just want to undermine the 
support rendered by widespread agreement of others – they also want to undermine the 
support provided by an individual’s own judgments, beliefs, or intuitions. After all, they still 
want to debunk our moral beliefs in cases where people disagree about moral matters.  
Secondly, we might take the evidence to be your believing that h. There are issues with this. 
Normatively speaking, we generally shouldn’t treat our beliefs as evidence, since that seems 
like double-counting. Moreover, as a descriptive matter, we don’t usually treat our beliefs as 
evidence either. As White (2010, p. 585) argues, we don’t take our belief that p as further 
evidence that p, and increase our confidence as a result. But perhaps things are different in 
the moral case: we might have been handed down certain beliefs, and just accepted that there 
was some good argument supporting these beliefs, even if we didn’t know what that argument 
was. While I have some sympathy for this line, I think modelling the situation using our 
intuitions as evidence (see below) is the least controversial route. I believe, however, that the 
same Bayesian machinery I propose can be fitted to using beliefs as evidence too (see n.8).  
Third, we can take our intuitions to be the evidence.6 We often make the following inference: 
“I have the intuition that h. This is evidence that h, and I should increase my credence in h.” 
We think we should update our credence in this way – and, as a descriptive matter, we do 
sometimes update like this. So I believe the Bayesian model should take your having certain 
intuitions as the evidence. We can be neutral about what exactly intuitions are – they could be 
dispositions to believe, sui generis mental states, etc. What’s crucial here is that these 
intuitions are separate from the final credence in h – in the sense that our final credence in h 
could be low, even when we have the intuition that h.  
 
4. The Bayesian Model of Debunking 
I’ll now present the Bayesian model, which involves three stages. Stage 1 defines the prior 
credence in the moral hypothesis and its alternatives, and some of the likelihoods. In stage 2, 
the debunker’s opponents introduce intuitions as evidence. Updating on these intuitions 
increases our credence in the moral hypothesis. In stage 3, the debunker introduces a 
 
6 See Climenhaga (2018) who argues that philosophers do use intuitions as evidence.   
debunking story about these intuitions. This changes the evidentiary weight accorded to the 
intuitions, mandating a reduction from the stage 2 credence in the moral hypothesis. 
Stage 1 
I will model debunking concerning a moral hypothesis h – keeping in mind that h could 
stand for any kind of moral claim; for instance, it might range from a specific claim like “It is 
morally impermissible to turn the trolley in the Loop case”, to a more general claim like 
“There can be no moral difference between two actions without there also being some non-
moral difference between them”. The evidence for h would be your having the intuition that 
h.  
Remember the priors represent an argumentative ‘free move’ – a probability distribution over 
the hypothesis and its alternatives, which both the debunkers and their opponents agree 
needs no further justification. What might this distribution look like? One plausible answer is 
that h is as likely to be true as it is to be false:7  
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) = 0.5 
𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ) = 1 − 𝐶𝑟(ℎ) = 0.5 
Next, the likelihoods, which represent the evidentiary weight we believe should be accorded 
to your having the intuition that h. Let Cr1(int|h) be the likelihood that you have the intuition 
that h, given that h is true, and Cr1(int|~h) be the likelihood that you have the intuition that h, 
given h is false.8 If we grant for now that intuitions are good indicators of the truth, we should 
accord them significant evidentiary weight. This is represented by a high Cr1(int|h) and a low 
Cr1(int|~h).9 
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡 | ℎ) = 0.9 
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡 | ~ℎ) = 0.1 
 
These likelihoods are analogous to the doctor’s beliefs about the true positive rate and the 
false positive rate of the test results. We can likewise see our moral intuitions as test results 
 
7 This follows the principle of indifference: “Given n mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities, none 
of which is favored over the others by the available evidence, the probability of each is 1/n.” (Weisberg, 2017, sec. 
2.1) 
8 If we took beliefs as evidence, these likelihoods represent the probability that we would believe as we do, given 
that the moral hypothesis is true or not. Then we are rather working backward to see if there are good 
arguments supporting our beliefs. Thanks here to Katie Steele. 
9 I used exact values to illustrate the model, but we shouldn’t take them too seriously. We could instead also 
perform a robustness analysis, over a range of different possible values, in more specific cases. 
that indicate something about the moral hypothesis – these intuitions likewise yield true and 
false positives at some rate.10  
 
Stage 2 
In stage 2, we introduce the evidence that you have the intuition that h. Applying Bayes 
Theorem and the Law of Total Probability, the new credence to adopt in the moral hypothesis 
is 
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
= 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑖𝑛𝑡)  
=
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) +  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|~ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ)
  
 
Substituting our values for Cr1(h), Cr1(~h), Cr1(int|h) and Cr1(int|~h), we have 
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)  
=  
0.9 × 0.5
(0.9 × 0.5) +  (0.1 × 0.5)
= 0.9 
 
Call Cr2(h) the evidential credence.11 It represents the confidence we should have in the moral 
hypothesis, after updating on having the relevant intuition. Just like how the doctor takes a 
positive test result as indication of the disease, the moral philosopher takes their having the 
intuition as evidence for the moral hypothesis. We should adopt an evidential credence of 0.9, 
an increase from the prior credence of 0.5. 
 
Stage 3 
The debunker then introduces a causal story about the intuitions that were treated as 
evidence – call this story.12 For example, the debunker might allege that these intuitions were 
 
10 See O’Neill (2015) and Sauer (2018, pp. 38–41), who talk about some debunking arguments in the language of 
true and false positives.  
11 This terminology comes from Kotzen (forthcoming), who talks about credences in defeat.  
12 I’ll assume we learn story with certainty, but this assumption could be relaxed, given that the current evidence 
might be unable to adjudicate between debunking and non-debunking evolutionary genealogies (Isserow, 2018, 
secs. 3–5). Jeffrey conditionalization should then be used – this tells us how to update our credence in the 
hypothesis when our credences in the evidential statements change, but are not raised to certainty. Even more 
produced by evolutionary processes aimed at promoting reproductive success, rather than at 
tracking the moral truths. This is analogous to the doctor discovering that their tests are 
unreliable. I’ll flesh out more details of the debunking story soon – for now, notice that in 
stage 3, we have two pieces of evidence, int and story. So the stage 3 credence in h should be 
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
= 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑖𝑛𝑡 & 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) 
 
Call 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) the debunked credence – it represents how confident we should be in h, after 
learning both the intuition and the debunking story. To relate this debunked credence to 
easily interpretable terms, I’ll expand it in a slightly different way:  
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
= 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑖𝑛𝑡 & 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)
=  
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ & 𝑖𝑛𝑡 & 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡 & 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)
  
=  
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ & 𝑖𝑛𝑡 & 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡 & 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ) +  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡 & 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ~ℎ)
 
=
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦). 𝐶𝑟 (𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦). 𝐶𝑟 (𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) +  𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 &~ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦). 𝐶𝑟 (𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)
=
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) +  𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 &~ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦)
 
 
Line 3 follows from the Ratio Formula. Line 4 expands the denominator Cr1(int&story) into 
the sum of credences in the two possibilities, Cr1(int&story&h) and Cr1(int&story&~h). Line 
5 expands all terms in the numerator and denominator using the chain rule for conditional 
credences.13 Line 6 factors out Cr1(story) from the numerator and denominator – arriving at a 
formula for the debunked credence that uses the priors and some new conditional credences, 
Cr1(int|story&h), Cr1(int|story&~h), Cr1(h|story), and Cr1(~h|story).14  
The debunker constrains these new conditional credences – this then affects the value of the 
debunked credence. Let’s start with the latter two, Cr1(h|story) and Cr1(~h|story). These 
represent the credence we should adopt in h and ~h respectively, given that we learn only 
 
interestingly, our credences could also be split between different debunking stories that impact the evidential 
weight of our intuitions differently.   
13 The chain rule formula says that Cr(A&B&C) = Cr(A|B&C).Cr(B|C).Cr(C) 
14 This same kind of derivation is used by Bovens and Hartmann (2004, p. 70) to model the reliability of 
scientific instruments.  
about story, but not about having the relevant intuitions. It seems that learning story should 
only affect our credence in h through undermining the intuitions that were used as evidence. 
If we just learned story alone, however, this shouldn’t affect our credence in the moral 
hypothesis at all. This is analogous to learning about the reliability of a medical test 
instrument, before we have learned about any results from that instrument – here, it seems 
like our opinions about the patient shouldn’t change.15 Similarly, in the debunking case, the 
following two conditions should apply  
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) = 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) 
𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) = 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ) 
 
That is, when we learn story alone, our credence in h should remain equal to our prior 
credence in h; likewise with our credence in not-h. These mirror similar conditions for 
undercutting defeaters (Kotzen, forthcoming, p. 10) – which bodes well for the model, since 
debunking arguments are often likened to undercutting defeaters (Kahane, 2011, p. 106; Lutz, 
2018; McGrath, 2014, pp. 210–211). Substituting these conditions into our formula for the 
stage 3 debunked credence, we have 
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
=
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) +  𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 &~ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ)
 
 
We can compare this with the stage 2 evidential credence, 
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)  
=
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) +  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|~ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ)
 
 
Notice that the likelihoods in these two formulas have changed. The stage 2 evidential 
credence was computed with Cr1(int|h) and Cr1(int|~h); in the stage 3 debunked credence, 
these are replaced by Cr1(int|story&h) and Cr1(int|story&~h) respectively. The debunker can 
be interpreted as constraining Cr1(int|story&h) and Cr1(int|story&~h), in order to achieve a 
reduction in credence as we move from stage 2 to 3. To understand how this works, we have 
to look at the details of two prominent debunking stories.   
 
15 For analogous conditions, see Kotzen (forthcoming, p. 10), Bovens and Hartmann (2004, p. 58). 
Two Debunking Stories 
The first debunking story concerns the contingency of our having certain intuitions. This 
story says we could easily have had different moral intuitions, even when the moral facts 
remained the same. For example, Joyce (2006, 2016) argues that our moral intuitions are 
evolutionarily contingent – we could easily have a different evolutionary history, leading to 
different moral intuitions, even though the moral facts remained the same. Challenges 
concerning demographic variation in our moral intuitions, or variation across different 
frames or conditions of a thought experiment (Liao et al., 2012; Machery, 2017, Chapters 2–3; 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011) work in the same way, but at a different temporal scale: our moral 
intuitions vary across different experimental conditions (or across demographic variables like 
culture), yet the moral facts remain the same. These challenges all highlight the low rate of 
true positives, given some debunking story – that is, alleging the low probability of your 
having the intuition that h, given that h and story are true. Call this kind of epistemic impact 
true positive less likely. This can be modelled in our example by lowering Cr1(int|story&h) to 
0.5 – as compared to Cr1(int|h), which was 0.9. Assuming the other values remain the same, 
constraining Cr1(int|story&h) to 0.5 means we should adopt a debunked credence of 0.83 in h 
– a reduction from stage 2’s evidential credence of 0.9 in h.16 By showing that the true positive 
rate for our intuitions is lower than what we initially thought, the debunker achieves a 
reduction in credence in h from stage 2.17 More generally, for true positive less likely to work, 
the debunkers need to ensure that 
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ <  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ) 
 
The second debunking story involves the inevitability of one’s intuitions. Here, the idea is that 
we would still have the same intuitions, even when the moral facts are changed. For example, 
Morton (2016, p. 242) argues that evolutionary processes would have made us believe that 
categorical moral reasons exist, regardless of whether or not such reasons actually do exist. 
This challenge alleges the high rate of false positives, given some debunking story – in 
 
16 The 0.5 value for the constrained Cr1(int|story&h) was chosen purely out of convenience. I believe its actual 
value will vary from case to case, depending on the strength of the debunking argument under consideration. I 
believe the relevant empirical evidence (for instance, about the counterfactual robustness of some evolutionarily-
influenced moral intuition) will provide the basis for setting this value. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the 
principle of indifference helps us set this value – though this principle might be used to model some other 
challenges, such as the purely odds-based argument suggested by Street (2006, p. 122) and formalised by Shafer-
Landau (2012, pp. 10–11). The above points will also apply to my modelling of constraints on Cr1(int|story&~h) 
below. Thanks here to an anonymous reviewer.    
17 This can be used to model debunking involving contingency or lack of safety (Bogardus, 2016, pp. 645–647; 
Handfield, 2016, p. 68; Joyce, 2006, p. 181), and counterfactual disagreement (Bogardus, 2016, pp. 655–657).   
particular, it highlights the high probability that you have the intuition that h, given that h is 
false and story is true. Call this kind of epistemic impact false positive more likely. This can be 
modelled in our example as constraining Cr1(int|story&~h) to 0.5 – as compared to 
Cr1(int|~h), which was 0.1. If all the other values are unchanged, constraining 
Cr1(int|story&~h) to 0.5 would mean we should adopt a debunked credence of 0.64 in h – a 
significant reduction from the 0.9 evidential credence in stage 2. By showing that the false 
positive rate for our intuitions is higher than initially thought, the debunkers also achieve a 
reduction of credence from stage 2.18 Generally, for false positive more likely to work, the 
debunkers need to show that  
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ~ℎ >  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|~ℎ) 
 
Either of the above two constraints will suffice for reducing confidence in h as we move from 
stage 2 to 3. Notice that the model doesn’t commit us to saying that the debunked credence 
must go below some specific threshold (like 0.5), as many debunking arguments seem to 
conclude.19 Instead it just says we should reduce confidence by some amount, and leaves open 
how large this reduction should be.20  
Moreover, the formula for the debunked credence allows us to quantitatively estimate the 
impact of debunking, which can come in useful. First, some theorists argue that we should 
resolve conflicts of intuition by comparing the best debunking argument for each opposing 
intuition (McPherson, 2014) – this formula gives us a precise way of doing so. Second, the 
formula can estimate the joint impact of false positive more likely and true positive less likely – 
this represents an advance, since they are usually only considered separately (for instance, 
sensitivity-based debunking arguments are run separately from safety-based ones).  
 
5. Implications and Extensions of the Bayesian Model 
Let’s now consider some implications and extensions.   
 
18 This can be used to model debunking arguments involving insensitivity (Bogardus, 2016, pp. 638–640; 
Morton, 2016, pp. 235, 242–243; Ruse & Wilson, 1986, pp. 186–187), and the screening-off of evidence (White, 
2010, pp. 580–581). Also see Climenhaga (2018, n. 26) who uses this to model the practice of offering error 
theories in philosophy.  
19 Joyce argues that the evolutionary evidence renders our moral beliefs “unjustified” (2006, p. 180), that we 
should “cultivate agnosticism” (2006, p. 181) until we get further evidence. Street (2006, p. 125) argues that our 
moral beliefs are “likely to be false”. Machery (2017, p. 95) argues that when we find demographic and 
presentation effects in philosophical cases, we “ought to suspend judgment”. 
20 Joyce (2016, p. 125) later argues that confidence in our moral beliefs should be “dented”.  
Debunking effect only conditional on a specific updating history 
The debunkers’ constraints mean that we should reduce credence in the moral hypothesis as 
we move from stage 2 to 3. For this debunking effect to happen, at least one of the following 
conditions must hold:   
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ <  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ) 
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ~ℎ >  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|~ℎ) 
 
Notice that these conditions depend crucially on the values of Cr1(int|h) and Cr1(int|~h) that 
were used for updating in stage 2. For instance, upon learning about the debunking story, you 
should reduce credence in the moral hypothesis only if you previously updated with a 
Cr1(int|h) that was higher than the constrained Cr1(int|story&h). That is, you should reduce 
credence in the moral hypothesis only if you updated on the intuitions thinking that the true 
positive rate was higher than it actually is. And vice versa with the false positive rate – you 
should only reduce confidence in h if you updated thinking that the false positive rate was 
lower than it actually is. This highlights the essentially historical nature of debunking 
arguments – such arguments don’t dictate that every agent should reduce confidence in h. 
Rather, only those who updated on their intuitions using a specific range of evidentiary 
weights are affected (as set out in the above inequalities). If someone had previously updated 
using different weights – for instance, if they updated using a Cr1(int|h) that was equal to 
Cr1(int|story&h), and Cr1(int|~h) equal to Cr1(int|story&~h) – the debunker’s constraints 
shouldn’t affect their credence at all.21 The Bayesian model makes clear that the debunking 
argument assumes a descriptive claim: it assumes that we have previously updated on our 
intuitions using a specific range of evidentiary weights.  
Recognising this essentially historical nature also reveals how constraints on Cr1(int|story&h) 
and Cr1(int|story&~h) could have a perverse effect. Suppose someone initially updated their 
beliefs with a very low evidentiary weight on their intuitions – taking Cr1(int|h) to be 0.001, 
for instance. The debunker then introduces story as evidence, constraining Cr1(int|story&h) 
to be 0.5. This person should now give their intuitions more evidentiary weight than before, 
since true positives are more likely than they initially thought. Other things being equal, the 
debunker’s constraint dictates that this person should increase credence in the moral 
 
21 Also see Climenhaga (2018, p. 86), who argues that if a philosopher didn’t take intuitions as evidence, they 
shouldn’t be affected by debunking explanations of those intuitions. 
hypothesis.22 This starkly illustrates how the debunking argument’s impact depends on what 
evidentiary weight we initially assigned to our intuitions.  
 
Two Special Cases 
Two special cases of epistemic impact are also worth highlighting. First, consider when the 
likelihoods are constrained so that  
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ =  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦&~ℎ) 
 
That is, it’s equally likely that you have the intuition that h, given that h and story are both 
true, as it is given that h is false and story is true. Here, the intuition is no guide to the moral 
hypothesis at all, and we should adopt a debunked credence that’s equal to our prior 
credence.23 Let Cr1(int|story&h) = Cr1(int|story&~h) = x. Then the debunked credence is  
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
=
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) +  𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 &~ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ)
=
0.5𝑥
0.5𝑥 +  0.5𝑥
= 0.5 = 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) 
 
The second case involves constraints such that 
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ <  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦&~ℎ) 
 
That is, it’s more likely that you have the intuition that h, given h is false and story is true, 
than it is that you have the intuition, given that h and story are both true. This constraint 
turns the intuition into an anti-reliable indicator – it is evidence for ~h! Consequently, the 
debunked credence could go below the prior credence. For instance, let Cr1(int|story&h) = 
 
22 This might happen when we discover surprising agreement or robustness in our intuitions, as presented by 
Knobe (2019).  
23 The calculation in this section pertains to the case where Cr1(h) = Cr1(~h) = 0.5, but the result – of the 
debunked credence being equal to prior credence – holds more generally. It obtains as long as Cr1(h) = 1-
Cr1(~h). Here’s the proof: Let Cr1(h) = p. So Cr1(~h) = 1-p. We can then compute the debunked credence, 
Cr3(h) = xp / [xp + x(1-p)] = xp / [xp + x - xp] = p = Cr1(h). Thanks here to an anonymous reviewer. 
0.3, Cr1(int|story&~h) =0.8, then the debunked credence in h will be 0.27 (a great reduction 
from the prior credence of 0.5).  
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
=
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) +  𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 &~ℎ . 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ)
=
0.3 × 0.5
(0.3 × 0.5) +  (0.8 × 0.5)
= 0.27 ≪  𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) 
 
Brosnan’s (2011, p. 54) framework implies that this as a tracking success – since our moral 
intuitions are indicators, albeit anti-reliable ones, of the moral facts. I beg to differ – since it 
would be cold comfort to learn that we should conclude exactly the opposite of what our 
moral intuitions tell us.24 
 
Marginal Effects of Constraining False Positive vs. True Positive Rate 
The model also has implications for the relative size of the two kinds of epistemic impact. It 
seems that point for point, false positive more likely has greater marginal impact on the 
debunked credence in h than true positive less likely. As an illustration, recall the initial 
examples from section 4. The example of false positive more likely – where the false positive 
rate of our intuitions was shown to be higher than we thought – constrained 
Cr1(int|story&~h) to a value that’s 0.4 greater than Cr1(int|~h), a 0.4 increase in the false 
positive rate. This lowered the debunked credence to 0.64. On the other hand, consider the 
example of true positive less likely, where the true positive rate of our intuitions was shown to 
be lower than initially thought. This constrained Cr1(int|story&h) to a value that’s 0.4 lower 
than Cr1(int|h) – a 0.4 decrease in the true positive rate. This only lowered the debunked 
credence to 0.825.  
This difference in marginal impact – where an instance of false positive more likely has greater 
impact on our credence in the moral hypothesis than an equal-sized instance of true positive 
less likely – is robust across all values that are relevant for the debunking debate. As long as 
Cr1(int|h) > Cr1(int|~h) – that is, as long as the intuition is taken as some positive indication 
of the hypothesis – false positive more likely will have a greater marginal impact than true 
 
24 I’m unaware of any real-world intuitions that would correspond to this case, but a hypothetical example would 
be learning that our moral intuitions were created by a powerful evil demon who is a moral expert, but who also 
wishes to instill non-veridical intuitions in us. Thanks here to an anonymous reviewer.   
positive less likely (see Appendix for proof). Put in more traditional epistemological terms, the 
Bayesian framework shows how sensitivity-based debunking arguments (which correspond 
to the impact of false positive more likely) have a greater effect on our moral views than safety-
based ones (which correspond to true positive less likely).   
 
The Role of Priors 
The prior credence in h, Cr1(h), plays an important role. Even if the debunkers successfully 
constrain Cr1(int|story&h) and Cr1(int|story&~h), this prior credence still greatly influences 
the debunked credence. Brosnan (2011, pp. 54–55) points out that no value of the likelihoods 
will be sufficient for determining the debunked credence, and concludes that the debunkers 
aren’t entitled to claiming that the moral hypothesis is likely false. 
This is correct, but I wonder if it’s a strong reply. Firstly, recall that we’re interpreting the 
priors as an argumentative ‘free move’ that is allowed by both sides of the debate. The 
debunkers wouldn’t allow the ‘free move’ of assigning a high prior credence to the moral 
hypothesis. Even if they did, all the work of defending against debunking is done by this 
assignment, rather than by any substantive argument. Leaning on the priors thus merely 
stipulates the problem of debunking away, rather than giving a positive answer to it. 
Secondly, even if the debunkers don’t show that our moral beliefs are likely false, they might 
still secure some weaker epistemic impact – like concluding that we should reduce confidence 
in the hypothesis. Finally, just constraining the likelihoods still counts as a significant 
achievement for the debunkers. This undermines at least some of the evidence cited by their 
opponents, and constrains the range of possible prior credences that could still vindicate our 
moral beliefs (that is, by still leading to a high debunked credence). 
 
Constraining (h|story) and (~h|story) 
In deriving the debunked credence, I said the debunkers should argue for the following two 
conditions:  
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) = 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) 
𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) = 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ) 
 
These, recall, concern how we shouldn’t change our credence in the moral hypothesis h if we 
just learned about the debunking story alone, without learning about the intuition. 
Opponents of debunking will contend, however, that these conditions don’t hold. Brosnan 
(2011, pp. 43, 59–61) argues that if we make some background normative assumptions, then 
some non-moral facts obtaining might raise the probability of some moral facts obtaining. So 
it could be that Cr1(h|story) ≠ Cr1(h); likewise for Cr1(~h|story) and Cr1(~h). For example, if 
we assume that wellbeing is generally morally good, then it might be that a belief’s being 
reproductively advantageous would raise the probability of its being true. This is because 
what promotes reproductive fitness will also generally promote wellbeing, which is itself a 
morally good thing. Responses along these lines are called third-factor accounts – they posit a 
third factor that explains how our evolutionarily-produced moral beliefs are correlated with 
the moral facts. To list two other examples: Enoch (2010, pp. 430–432) argues that 
evolutionary causes tend to produce beliefs that promote survival, and survival tends to be a 
morally good thing. Wielenberg (2010, pp. 449–450) contends that for an organism to form 
moral beliefs about rights, it must have sufficiently sophisticated cognitive faculties to do so. 
But if an organism had such faculties, it would possess rights of its own.  
Rather than settling the debate over legitimate background assumptions, I want to 
demonstrate how the Bayesian analysis can contribute. Recall our initial formula for the 
debunked credence, before substituting in the two above constraints. This formula took 
Cr1(h|story) and Cr1(~h|story) as inputs. The debunker might just concede to their opponents 
that Cr1(h|story) > Cr1(h), for instance, but argue that Cr1(h|story) is only a bit higher than 
Cr1(h). In fact, the proponents of third-factor accounts typically admit that the correlation 
between the moral and non-moral facts could be quite weak (Enoch, 2010, p. 430), or only say 
that there might be a correlation (Brosnan, 2011, p. 61). In light of this, the debunker might 
thus allow that the correlation exists, use that to compute Cr1(h|story) and Cr3(h), and argue 
that this correlation isn’t strong enough to vindicate high credence in the relevant moral 
propositions. Alternatively, the opponents can show how Cr1(h|story) and Cr1(~h|story) 
could in fact vindicate high moral credences. The initial formula for the debunked credence 
shows how we can move beyond a binary debate – about whether some non-moral facts raise 
the probability of a moral fact obtaining – to a graded one, about how much probability-
raising is required to maintain a high credence in the relevant moral hypothesis. This formula 
also indicates how we might use our credences in background normative assumptions – 
which might concern our metaethical theories, for instance – in computing our moral 
credences. 
 
Proximate and Ultimate Causes 
Debunking stories could also focus on different kinds of causes that contributed to producing 
our moral intuitions. The proximate causes operate within our lifetimes (like the immediate 
psychological mechanisms that process the framing of a case) while the ultimate causes 
operate outside our lifetimes (such as natural selection operating over many generations). 
How might information about these causes contribute to the final moral credence? O’Neill 
(2015) argues that when it comes to the reliability of our moral beliefs, information from the 
proximate causes has priority over information from ultimate causes.25 This is because if we 
can tell whether our moral beliefs are reliable just from information about the proximate 
causes, then information about the ultimate causes tells us nothing more. I find her 
arguments convincing – and if we accept her conclusion, we get further direction on how to 
use information about these causes in our computation of the debunked credence.  
In the Bayesian framework, we can interpret O’Neill as concluding that information about 
proximate causes screens off information about ultimate causes, when it comes to the 
reliability of our moral beliefs. This places further constraints on the relevant likelihoods. 
Suppose now we have two different debunking stories about a moral intuition – a proximate 
story that pertains to proximate causes of that intuition, and an ultimate story, which pertains 
to its ultimate causes. O’Neill’s arguments can be read as constraining our likelihoods such 
that:  
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & 𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ = 𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ) 
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & 𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ~ℎ = 𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ~ℎ) 
 
That is, the likelihood of having the intuition, given the truth of a proximate debunking story, 
an ultimate debunking story, and h, should just be equal to the likelihood given the proximate 
story and h. (Likewise for the likelihood of having the intuition given that h is false.) Because 
the reason why we care about information from the ultimate causes at all is because we want 
to know whether the proximate causes are reliable or not. And if we already had a good idea 
of the reliability of the proximate cause, learning more information from the ultimate causes 
should produce no further impact. These two constraints caution us against double-counting 
information about unreliability – when we have such information from both the proximate 
and ultimate causes, they don’t add up linearly.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I presented a Bayesian model of the debunking debate. The model first involves 
updating on the intuition that h, yielding an increased evidential credence. The debunkers 
then introduce a debunking story. Updating on both the intuition and the story yields the 
 
25 O’Neill (2015, n. 1) defines proximate and ultimate causes in a different way – but this won’t matter here. 
debunked credence – which is computed using some new likelihoods, Cr1(int|story&h) and 
Cr1(int|story&~h). The debunker hopes to constrain these likelihoods, such that the 
debunked credence is lower than evidential credence. This happens when at least one of the 
following two conditions hold:   
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ℎ <  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ) 
𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡│𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 & ~ℎ >  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|~ℎ) 
 
The first condition leads to the impact of true positive less likely – the true positive rate of our 
intuitions is revealed to be lower than we initially thought. The second condition leads to the 
impact of false positive more likely – the false positive rate is revealed to be higher than we 
thought. This model has important implications: firstly, that the debunking effect is only 
conditional on the agent’s having a specific update history – the debunker shouldn’t argue 
that every agent should reduce confidence. Secondly, the debunker is only licensed to 
conclude that we should reduce confidence by some amount, and not that we should reduce 
beyond some threshold. Third, we can quantitatively integrate evidence about the two kinds 
of epistemic impact, about legitimate background assumptions, about the different possible 
origins of our moral beliefs, and about the different kinds of causes of our moral beliefs, in 
order to arrive at a final rational moral credence. I also argued that point-for-point, the 
epistemic impact of false positive more likely has greater marginal effect on our credence in h 
than true positive less likely. 
This model doesn’t call the debunking debate in favour of one side or another. Instead, I hope 
to have clarified hidden assumptions and drawn out important implications, while being 
sensitive to the quantitative nature of the debunking argument’s epistemic conclusion. With 
these more clearly in view, we’ll be in a better position to decide when, if ever – and by how 
much – we should change our moral beliefs upon learning about their origins.  
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Appendix 
Here I identify the conditions under which the marginal impact of false positive more likely is 
greater than that of true positive less likely. First recall the formula for the stage 2 evidential 
credence:  
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)  
=
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)
𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) +  𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|~ℎ). 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ)
 
 
For ease of exposition, I’ll adopt simpler notation and simplify this formula. Let 𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|ℎ) =
𝑇 (for the true positive rate) and 𝐶𝑟 (𝑖𝑛𝑡|~ℎ) =  𝐹 (the false positive rate), and let 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) =
𝐻 and 𝐶𝑟 (~ℎ) = 1 − 𝐻. The formula then becomes 
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ)  
=
𝑇𝐻
𝑇𝐻 +  𝐹(1 − 𝐻)
 
 
The marginal impact of the two kinds of debunking can be found by partially differentiating 
𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) with respect to T and F respectively. Partial differentiation is useful here because it 
helps us compute the rate of change of one variable with respect to another, while holding all 
other variables constant.  
To see how this is useful, first consider the marginal impact of true positive less likely. This 
impact can be found by first partially differentiating 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) with respect to T (the true 
positive rate). The resulting derivative represents how much 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) would change if we 
increased the true positive rate by a small amount, while holding all other variables (the priors 
and the false positive rate) constant. We then negate this result, because true positive less likely 
involves a decrease in the true positive rate: 






(𝑇𝐻 + 𝐹(1 − 𝐻))
  
 
Now consider false positive more likely. We simply partially 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) with respect to F (the false 
positive rate) – the result tells us how much 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ) would change if we increased the false 
positive rate by a small amount, while holding all other variables constant. There is no need to 
negate the result like before, since false positive more likely involves an increase in the false 
positive rate:  






(𝑇𝐻 + 𝐹(1 − 𝐻))
  
 
Assume that 𝑇 > 0 and that 0 < 𝐻 < 1. False positive more likely has a greater marginal 
impact when it creates a greater reduction in 𝐶𝑟 (ℎ). That is, when  
Thus when the initial true positive rate is greater than the initial false positive rate, false 
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